GRAVITY PROBE-B
PAYLOAD TESTING
PROCEDURE

GUARD TANK PRESSURIZATION FOR TRANSPORT

P0801 Rev-

January 18, 2001

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REVISION RECORD

REVISION	ECO	PAGES	DATE

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AG-x	Gauge x of Gas Module auxiliary section
AMI	American Magnetics Inc.
ATC	Advanced Technology Center
Aux	Auxiliary
AV-x	Valve x of Gas Module auxiliary section
Bot	Bottom
CN [xx]	Data acquisition channel number
DAS	Data Acquisition System
EFM	Exhaust gas Flow Meter
EG-x	Gauge x of Gas Module exhaust section
EM	Electrical Module
ERV-x	Relief valve of Gas Module exhaust section
EV-x	Valve number x of Gas Module exhaust section
FCV	Fill Cap Valve
FIST	Full Integrated System Test
GHe	Gaseous Helium
GM	Gas Module
GP-B	Gravity Probe-B
GSE	Ground Support Equipment
GT	Guard Tank
GTVC	Guard Tank Vent Cap
GTVC-G	Guard Tank Vent Cap pressure gauge
GTVC-RV	Guard Tank Vent Cap relief valve
GTVC-V	Guard Tank Vent Cap valve
GTV-G	Guard Tank vent pressure gauge
GTV-RV	Guard Tank vent relief valve
GTV-V	Guard Tank vent valve
HX-x	Vent line heat exchanger in Gas Module
KFxx	Quick connect o-ring vacuum flange (xx mm diameter)
LHe	Liquid Helium
LHSD	Liquid Helium Supply Dewar
Liq	Liquid
LL	Liquid level
LLS	Liquid level sensor
LMMS	Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space
LMSC	Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.
MT	Main Tank
MTVC	Main Tank Vent Cap
MTVC-G	Main Tank Vent Cap pressure gauge
MTVC-RV	Main Tank Vent Cap relief valve
MTVC-V	Main Tank Vent Cap valve
NBP	Normal boiling point
ONR	Office of Naval Research
PFCG	Fill Cap assembly pressure Gauge
PFM	Pump equipment Flow Meter
PG-x	Gauge x of Pump equipment
PM	Pump Module
psi	pounds per square inch
psig	pounds per square inch gauge
PTD	Payload Test Director
PV-x	Valve x of the Pump equipment
QA	Quality Assurance
RAV-x	Remote Actuated Valve-x
RGA	Residual Gas Analyzer
SMD	Science Mission Dewar
STV	SMD Thruster vent Valve
SU	Stanford University
SV-x	SMD Valve number x
TG-x	Gauge x of Utility Turbo System
TV-x	Valve x of Utility Turbo System
UTS	Utility Turbo System
Vac	Vacuum
VCP-x	Vent cap pressure gauge
VCRV-x	Vent cap relief valve
VCV-x	Vent cap valve
VDC	Volts Direct Current
VF-x	Liquid helium Fill line valve
VG-x	Gauge x of Vacuum Module
VM	Vacuum Module
VV-x	Valve x of Vacuum Module
VW-x	Valve x of Dewar Adapter

A. SCOPE

This procedure describes the steps necessary to mount the Auxiliary Pressurization System on the SMD transporter or remove it from the transporter. The steps include:

Disconnect the pressurization line between the Auxiliary Helium Pressurization System and the Guard Tank,

Move the Auxiliary Helium Pressurization System to or from the transporter,

Re-pressurize the Guard Tank.

B. SAFETY

B.1. Potential Hazards

Personal injury and hardware damage can result during normal positioning, assembly and disassembly of hardware. Examples include: positioning Dewar in tilt stand; integrating probe with airlock; positioning airlock on Dewar; removing airlock from Dewar; removing probe from Dewar; and positioning support equipment such as pressurized gas cylinders and supply dewars.

A number of undesired events may be associated with these operations. For example, personnel or equipment can be struck when hardware is being moved (e.g. by forklift or crane load). Personnel are subject to entrapment while positioning hardware, such as hands or feet caught between objects as hardware is moved into place. Suspended hardware may be dropped. Personnel can be caught between objects such as forklifts and walls or loads and building support columns.

In addition, liquid helium used in the SMD represents a hazardous material for the personnel involved in the operations. Cryogenic burns can be caused by contact with the cold liquid or gas, high pressures can result if boiling liquid or cold gas is confined without a vent path, and asphyxiation can result if the vent gas is allowed to accumulate.

The SMD Safety Compliance Assessment, document GPB-100153C discusses the safety design, operating requirements and the hazard analysis of the SMD.

B.2. Mitigation of Hazards

B.2.1. Lifting hazards

There are no lifting operations in this procedure.

B.2.2. Cryogenic Hazards

The FIST OPS laboratory has an oxygen deficiency monitor that alarms when the oxygen level is reduced to 19.5%. Additional temperature and pressure alarms, provided by the DAS, warn of potential over-pressure conditions. Emergency vent line deflectors are installed over the four burst disks on the SMD vacuum shell, and oxygen collection pans are on the floor beneath them.

The following requirements apply to personnel involved in cryogenic operations. Gloves that are impervious to liquid helium and liquid nitrogen are to be worn whenever the possibility of splashing or

impingement of high-velocity cryogens exists or when handling equipment that has been cooled to cryogenic temperatures. Protective clothing and full-face shields are to be worn whenever the possibility of splashing cryogens exists.

The FIST Emergency Procedures document, SU/GP-B P0141, discusses emergency procedures. These documents should be reviewed for applicability at any facility where the hardware is operated.

B.2.3. Other Hazards

When appropriate, tools or other items used with the potential to damage the SMD or Probe shall be tethered. In addition, a foreign object and debris shield usually covers the upper cone of the SMD and is required whenever work is being performed above the SMD such that hard objects could fall and impact the apparatus.

B.3. **Injuries**

In case of any injury obtain medical treatment as follows
LMMS **Call 117;** Stanford University **Call 9-911**

C. QUALITY ASSURANCE

C.1. QA Notification

The ONR representative and SU QA shall be notified 24 hours prior to the start of this procedure. Upon completion of this procedure, the QE Manager will certify his/her concurrence that the effort was performed and accomplished in accordance with the prescribed instructions by signing and dating in the designated place(s) in this document.

C.2. Red-line Authority

Authority to red-line (make minor changes during execution) this procedure is given solely to the PTD or his designate and shall be approved by the QA Representative. Additionally, approval by the Hardware Manager shall be required, if in the judgement of the PTD or QA Representative, experiment functionality may be affected.

C.3. Discrepancies

A Quality Assurance Representative designated by D. Ross shall review any discrepancy noted during this procedure, and approve its disposition. Discrepancies will be recorded in a D-log or a DR per Quality Plan P0108. Any time a procedure calls for verification of a specific configuration and that configuration is not the current configuration, it represents a discrepancy of one of three types. These types are to be dealt with as described below.

1. If the discrepancy has minimal effect on procedure functionality (such as the state of a valve that is irrelevant to performance of the procedure) it shall be documented in the procedure, together with the resolution. Redlines to procedures are included in this category.

2. If the discrepancy is minor and affects procedure functionality but not flight hardware fit or function, it shall be recorded in the D-log. Resolution shall be in consultation with the PTD and approved by the QA representative.
3. All critical and major discrepancies, those that effect flight hardware fit or functions, shall be documented in a D-log and also in a Discrepancy Report, per P0108.

D. TEST PERSONNEL

D.1. Personnel Responsibilities

The performance of this procedure requires a minimum complement of personnel as determined by the Test Director. The Test Director is the designated signer for the “witnessed by” sign-off located at the end of each procedure. The person in charge of the operation (Test Director or Test Engineer) is to sign the “completed by” sign-off.

D.2. Personnel Qualifications

The Test Director must have a detailed understanding of all procedures and facility operations and experience in all of the SMD operations. Test Engineers must have SMD Cryogenic operations experience and an understanding of the operations and procedures used for the cryogenic servicing/maintenance of the Dewar.

D.3. Qualified Personnel

Test Director	*Test Engineer*
Mike Taber	Tom Welsh
Dave Murray	Chris Gray
Jim Maddocks	Bruce Clarke
Dave Frank	

E. REQUIREMENTS

E.1. Electrostatic Discharge Requirements

N/A

E.2. Lifting Operation Requirements

N/A

E.3. Hardware/Software Requirements

Auxiliary Helium Pressurization System (Figure 1).

E.4. Instrument Pretest/Calibration Requirements

N/A

E.5. CONFIGURATION REQUIREMENTS

Payload not connected to GSE (EM, GM, DAS, or VM)

F. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

F.1. Drawings

Drawing No.	*Title*
LMMS-5833394	*Instrumentation Installation*

F.2. Supporting documentation

Document No.	*Title*
LMMC-5835031	*GP-B Magnetic Control Plan*
GPB-100153C	*SMD Safety Compliance Assessment*
SU/GP-B P0141	*FIST Emergency Procedures*
LMSC-P088357	*Science Mission Dewar Critical Design Review*
SU/GP-B P0108	*Quality Plan*
LMMS GPB-100333	*Science Mission Dewar Failure Effects and Causes Analysis*
SU/GP-B P059	*GP-B Contamination Control Plan*

F.3. Additional Procedures

N/A

Operation Number:_____

Date Initiated:_____

Time Initiated:_____

G. **OPERATIONS**

G.1. **Remove Pressurization Line From Guard Tank**

G.1.1. Close GTV-Va

G.1.2. Remove pressurization line from GTV-Va.

G.2. **Move Auxiliary He Pressurization Bottle**

G.2.1. Close CG-1.

G.2.2. Reduce pressure at CG-1 and CG-2 to 0.0 psig.

G.2.3. Remove CPR-1 regulator assembly from helium bottle.

G.2.4. Move helium bottle (perform one of the following)

- Lift helium bottle onto transporter and secure.
- Remove helium bottle from transporter and secure in dolly.

G.2.5. Install CPR-1 regulator assembly on helium bottle.

G.2.6. Open CG-1.

G.2.7. Close CG-2

G.3. **Re-pressurize Guard Tank**

G.3.1. Set CPR-1 to regulate at 2.5 to 3 psig.

G.3.2. Open CG-2 and purge pressurization line for 1 minute.

G.3.3. Crack open GTV-Va and install pressurization line at GTV-Va while purging.

G.3.4. Open GTV-Va fully.

Completed by:_____

Witnessed by:_____

Date: _____

Time:_____

Quality Manager_____**Date**_____

Payload Test Director_____**Date**_____



Figure 1 Auxiliary Helium Pressurization System.